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AN EXPECTED HARM APPROACH TO COMPENSATING 
CONSUMERS FOR UNAUTHORIZED INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURES 
 
by Rachel Yoo* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] On May 22, 2007, the Executive Office of the President of the 
United States issued a memorandum concerned with safeguarding 
personal information, which first defined the term “personally identifiable 
information” as follows: 
  
[I]nformation which can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individual's identity, such as their name, social security 
number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined 
with other personal or identifying information which is 
linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and 
place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.1 
 
[2] Since then, technological advances have enormously expanded the 
realm of personally identifiable information, thereby diminishing the 
distinction between Personally Identifiable Information and non-
Personally Identifiable Information.2  Personally Identifiable Information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* J.D., 2012, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.  Many thanks to 
Professor Max Huffman for the generous amount of time he devoted to reviewing this 
paper and for his consistent, and greatly appreciated, support and encouragement.  I am 
so grateful for his help and truly could not have done this without him.  
 
1 Memorandum from John Clay III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. & Budget,  
to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1 n.1 (May 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-16.pdf. 
 
2 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 35-38 (2010) 
[hereinafter PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.	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is information that directly links to one individual, such as a name, address, 
or Social Security number. 3   On the other hand, non-Personally 
Identifiable Information is anonymous information, which by itself cannot 
identify an individual, such as location, web browsing history, and 
shopping records.4  However, de-identified data could easily turn into 
identifiable data.  In 2008, Netflix released certain anonymized data about 
its consumers’ movie viewing habits so researchers could improve 
Netflix’s algorithm for recommending films.5  “Despite Netflix’s effort to 
de-identify the data set, researchers using other publicly available 
information were able to re-identify specific Netflix customers and 
associate information about the films they had rented.”6  As demonstrated 
by this research, any information connected with an individual could 
constitute personally identifiable information and therefore, distinguishing 
Personally Identifiable Information from non-Personally Identifiable 
Information becomes useless. 
  
[3] Data breaches, which involve both Personally Identifiable 
Information and non-Personally Identifiable Information, take place so 
frequently that they no longer constitute news.7  According to the Identity 
Theft Resource Center, there were 414 breaches exposing 22,945,773 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See id. at 35. 
 
4 See id; see also Privacy, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 
http://www.medcohealth.com/medco/consumer/useOfInfo.jsp?articleAppId=HelpCenter
CB_Privacy&loc=GNAVHDR&accessLink=medcomedicarehome12 (last updated Sept. 
20, 2012). 
 
5 See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 38. 
 
6 Id; see Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large 
Sparse Datasets 8, available at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf. 
 
7 See generally U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE 
FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTIFY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE 
FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 11-12 (2007), available at 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf; John Stringer, Protecting personally identifiable 
information:  What data is at risk and what you can do about it, SOPHOS, 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.sophos.com/sophos/docs/eng/dst/sophos-protecting-pii-wpna.pdf. 
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records in 2011,8 numbers similar to those of 2010 in which 662 breaches 
occurred, resulting in 16,167,542 disclosures.9  Hacking has long become 
a leading cause of breaches,10 accounting for 22.7% of the total number of 
breached records exposed in 2010.11  In 2009, hacking was responsible for 
as much as 63% of the total amount of data exposed.12  The 2010 Verizon 
security report, a leading data breach investigation report, points out that 
85% of hacking attacks were “not considered highly difficult”13 and the 
same has been denoted in the past.14  The report concludes that most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2011 BREACH LIST 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202011.pdf. 
 
9 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2010 BREACH LIST 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Report_20101229.pdf.  
 
10 See Mathew J. Schwartz, Hacking Becomes Leading Cause of Data Breaches, 
INFORMATION WEEK (Apr. 22, 2011, 12:27 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/229402094. 
 
11 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2010 DATA BREACH HACKING CATEGORY SUMMARY 1 
(2010), available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Stats_-
_Hacking_Summary_20101229.pdf.  The number of breaches and the amount of data 
loss is related, but they are not the same.  The number of breaches means the number of 
incidents that resulted in a data loss and each breach carries a certain amount of data loss.  
 
12 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2009 DATA BREACH HACKING CATEGORY SUMMARY 1 
(2010), available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/ITRC_Breach_Stats_-
_Hacking_Summary_20100106.pdf. 
 
13 WADE BAKER ET. AL, VERIZON, 2010 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 3 (2010) 
[hereinafter 2010 DATA BREACH REPORT], available at 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_2010-data-breach-
report_en_xg.pdf.	  
 
14 Both 2008 and 2009 reports indicated that 83% of attacks were not highly sophisticated.  
WADE H. BAKER ET. AL, VERIZON, 2009 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT, 3 
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 DATA BREACH REPORT], 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf; 
WADE H. BAKER ET. AL, VERIZON, 2008 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT, 3 
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breaches could have been avoided without difficult or expensive 
controls.15  These findings provide a clear picture of the circumstances 
surrounding data breaches, indicating that a majority of data loss due to 
hacking could have been prevented by database operators, yet they failed 
to do so.  Nonetheless, a lack of actual damage forces victims of data 
breaches to bear the loss whereas database operators escape liability. 
  
[4] When security of a database is undermined, an individual loses 
Personally Identifiable Information, resulting in harm ranging from 
negligible to destructive.  However, not only is it impossible to know the 
ramifications of the loss until the loss causes actual harm, but it is also 
unreasonable to compel an individual to wait until said individual becomes 
injured.  Therefore, the data loss itself should constitute an actionable 
injury and compensable harm.  Therefore, the Federal Trade Commission, 
after conducting research, should assign values to each type of data loss 
and enforce compensation.  To that end, this article proposes an approach 
that considers the expected value of harm and the benefits of disclosure to 
measure the harm caused by a breach.  The expected value of harm and 
the benefits of disclosure compose the Value of Information formula.  In 
accordance with this formula, financially sensitive information, medical 
information, and socially accepted disclosable information are valued in 
descending order.  
 
[5] Part II categorizes Personally Identifiable Information into three 
groups according to its character and use: financially sensitive information, 
medical information, or socially accepted disclosable information.  
Financially sensitive information encompasses information created by 
financial institutions for facilitating financial transactions and a Social 
Security number.  Medical information is information with respect to an 
individual’s physical and mental health condition.  Socially accepted 
disclosable information is information that is part private and part public, 
and is categorized into direct socially accepted disclosable information or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 DATA BREACH REPORT], available at 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/databreachreport.pdf. 
 
15 2010 DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 13. 
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indirect socially accepted disclosable information.  These three types of 
information are ranked based on their value of information, which is 
proportional to the extent of harm derived from disclosure.  However, the 
benefits of disclosure offset the extent of harm.  
 
[6] Part III analyzes how to justify compensation.  Negligence tort 
liability fails to compensate victims of data breaches because victims have 
not suffered actual harm.  However, courts deciding medical malpractice 
and environmental toxic tort claims have acknowledged future harm and 
an increased threat of future injury when it is reasonably linked to harm 
done.  In situations where database operators could not have prevented 
breaches due to sophisticated hacking techniques, this paper proposes 
strict liability since collecting information constitutes an ultrahazardous 
activity where significant social utilities and losses coexist.  Moreover, the 
imposition of strict liability is appropriate since it optimizes the extent of 
data collection and makes database operators, the least cost avoiders, bear 
the losses.   
 
[7] Part IV examines how to structure a uniform compensation scheme.  
An examination of state and federal statutes, which penalize unlawful 
disclosure of Personal Identifiable Information and impose civil penalties, 
demonstrates that such laws fail to weigh the different values of each type 
of information.  Ultimately, this article argues that Congress should enact 
a law requiring the Federal Trade Commission to collect evidence of the 
value of information and to establish a comprehensive civil penalty 
scheme.  The compensation scheme should pursue deterrence and 
effective compensation rather than to simply punish database operators. 
 
II.  HOW TO CATEGORIZE AND RANK 
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 
 
[8] Each form of Personally Identifiable Information is different.  
Some are created to serve a particular purpose, whereas others are 
assigned by the government.  Some are designed to remain private and 
others are made to share with people.  Since each piece of Personally 
Identifiable Information carries distinct information, respective 
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information should be weighted differently.  Thus, this article categorizes 
each type of information based on its use, purpose, and character into 
financially sensitive information, medical information, or socially 
accepted disclosable information.  Furthermore, it introduces the Value of 
Information equation in order to measure the value of each type of 
information.  The equation ranks financially sensitive information, 
medical information, and socially accepted disclosable information in 
descending order.  
 
[9] A disclosure of each form of information entails different harm and 
the degree of harm is proportional to the value of information.  In 
measuring the value of information, this article takes into account two 
factors: first, the expected value of harm, and second, the benefits of 
disclosure.  The most common harm is monetary loss.  It is related to 
almost any type of information disclosure and it is the most likely outcome 
of disclosure.  The amount of loss varies according to the type of disclosed 
information.  The expected value of harm further increases when legal 
recourses, such as a private right of action or criminal prosecution, do not 
exist.  This is because an abuse of personal information is more likely to 
occur when there is no imprisonment or civil penalty for misusing it.  
However, not all disclosure is detrimental.  Certain disclosures benefit 
society as well as individuals and the benefits of these disclosures offset 
the harm derived from the disclosures. 16   Therefore, the value of 
information can be calculated by combining the expected value of harm 
less the benefits of disclosure. 
 
  
Value of Information = Expected Value of Harm – Benefits of Disclosure 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For example, under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, certain 
disclosures of personal information are permitted to prevent or lessen a serious and 
imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public.  45 C.F.R. § 
164.512(j)(1)(i) (2011). 
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A.  Financially Sensitive Information 
 
[10] Financially sensitive information includes all information that 
enables people to engage in financial transactions.  For example, Bank of 
America requires a Social Security number, debit card or bank account 
number, home address, current e-mail address, and if applicable, online 
banking ID and passcode in order for an individual to open an account.17  
Information required to carry out financial transactions involves two 
pieces of information, information created by financial institutions and a 
Social Security number.  
 
1.  Information Created by Financial Institutions 
 
[11] Financial institutions generate information for facilitating financial 
transactions, and information created by financial institutions is key to 
these transactions.  Financial institutions usually handle thousands of 
customers and deal with millions of dollars, making it important that they 
correctly identify the sources of customers’ funds in addition to giving 
customers flexibility to control their funds.  To this end, information 
created by financial institutions is a highly convenient tool because it is 
easily generated and readily destroyed.18  Bank account numbers, credit 
card numbers, and bank account and credit card passwords are all typical 
information created by financial institutions.  In addition, due to the 
emergence of online banking, online IDs and passwords now constitute 
information created by financial institutions.  
  
[12] Information created by financial institutions is unique in the sense 
that customers are required to pay fees to create, maintain, use, and secure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Apply Online Frequently Asked Questions, BANK OF AMERICA, 
http://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/checksave/index.cfm?template=lc_faq_applyonl
ine&context=&statecheck=VA&cd_bag=&sa_bag=&ch_bag= (last visited Sept. 28, 
2012). 
  
18 See generally Bank of America Privacy & Security, BANK OF AMERICA, 
https://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/Control.do?body=privacysecur_faqs (describing 
the customer information banks collect, generate and use). 
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their information.19  Credit card companies often charge fees to issue 
credit cards and customers are required to pay annual fees to keep 
benefits.20  Banks impose monthly service fees unless customers meet 
certain requirements.21  Due to the sensitive nature of information created 
by financial institutions and the direct financial losses deriving from its 
misuse, financial institutions are required to establish stringent security 
measures.22  However, data breaches occur often.23  According to the 2010 
Verizon Breach Report, which analyzed 141 breach cases involving 143 
million data losses, 33% of breaches occurred in the financial services 
sector in 2010, making information created by financial institutions the 
most vulnerable type of information,24 resulting in a direct monetary loss.  
 
[13] For example, in Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Financial Bank, the 
Shames-Yeakels, who were bank customers, sued Citizens Financial Bank 
when an unauthorized person gained access to their online account.25  The 
thief used the customers’ username and password to order a $26,500 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See generally Take on Your Bank, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2012, at 16-19, available at 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/02/bank-accounts/index.htm 
(describing different types of fees and why banks charge them). 
 
20 See Sarah Morgan, Are Credit-Card Annual Fees Reason to Walk?, SMARTMONEY 
(July 20, 2010), http://www.smartmoney.com/spend/family-money/is-a-credit-cards-
annual-fee-reason-to-snub-it/. 
 
21 See Katherine Yung, Big banks hit customers with higher fees, and more of them, USA 
TODAY (May 15, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2011-05-15-bank-fees_n.htm.	  
 
22 See 2010 DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 13, at 8. 
 
23 See generally IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2012 BREACH LIST (2012), available at 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202012.pdf (listing all 
reported breaches). 
 
24 2010 DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
 
25 677 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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advance on the customers’ home equity credit line.26  The thief wired the 
money from Citizens Financial Bank to a bank in Hawaii and then 
transferred it to a bank in Austria.27  The Austrian bank refused to return 
the money. 28   Despite knowing that the customers’ username and 
password were stolen, Citizens Financial Bank billed them for $26,500.29  
After several unfruitful complaints, the customers filed suit alleging, a 
violation of the Fair Credit Report Act (“FCRA”) and negligence in the 
bank’s duty to secure customers’ confidential information.30  The bank 
moved for summary judgment.31  The court ruled that genuine issues of 
material fact existed as to whether the bank breached its duty to 
sufficiently secure its online banking system and as to the reasonableness 
of the bank's decision to report the credit account as delinquent without 
acknowledging the disputed nature of the customers' debt.32  The court 
reasoned that despite knowing that the customers contested the debt, the 
bank still reported the customers’ account as delinquent to national credit 
bureaus, which would mislead a reasonable finder and have an adverse 
effect on the customers’ credit.33  
 
[14] Although the court suggested the customers might have a claim 
under the FCRA, the FCRA cannot accommodate a customer whose 
information created by financial institutions is compromised by a third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Id. at 998. 
 
27 Id. 
 
28 Id. 
 
29 Id. 998-99. 
 
30 Shames-Yeakel, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 999-1000, 1003, 1008.  
 
31 Id. at 996. 
 
32 Id. at 1005-09.   
 
33 Id. at 1005.  
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party.34  This is because the FCRA only involves the accuracy of a credit 
report and deals with issues regarding reporting information in dispute.35  
In other words, the court’s finding was based on the bank’s failure to 
report the nature of debt, rather than its failure to safeguard the customers’ 
information.  
 
[15] Another statute regulating financial institutions and the collection 
of financial data is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”).36  The GLBA 
states, “each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing 
obligation to respect the privacy of its customer and to protect the security 
and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”37  
It prohibits a financial institution from disclosing “nonpublic personal 
information” unless the institution has provided a privacy notice to the 
consumer and regulates to whom the consumer’s information may be 
disclosed.38  In defining “nonpublic personal information,” the statute 
focuses on the source of information, so if obtained through a non-publicly 
accessible source, the information is nonpublic personal information.39  
Examples given in the statute illustrate that an individual’s name and 
address obtained through account information, which is not publicly 
accessible, is non-public personal information, whereas the same 
information supplied by a publicly available source, such as a phone book, 
is public personal information.40  Such a distinction, however, renders the 
statute unenforceable in many instances of its application since sources of 
information have expanded enormously due to the Internet, making it next 
to impossible to detect the exact source.  Even if a consumer manages to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Shames-Yeakel, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1005. 
 
35 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). 
 
36 See id.  
 
37 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2006).    
 
38 Id. § 6802(a)-(b). 
 
39 See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(n) (2012).   
 
40 See id. § 313.3 (n), (p).  
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prove that his or her financial institution violates the GLBA, courts 
uniformly have ruled that no private right of action exists under the 
GLBA.41  
 
[16] For instance, in Menton v. Experian Corp., the plaintiff alleged the 
defendant Experian violated the statute through its continuous sale of 
consumer identifying information, but the court concluded that even 
“assuming arguendo” that the allegations were true, “the GLBA does not 
provide for a private right of action.”42  The court found support for its 
holding in the statute’s text, which states that it “shall be enforced by the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Federal functional 
regulators, the State insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade 
Commission with respect to financial institutions and other persons 
subject to their jurisdiction.”43  In other words, only governmental entities 
can bring a cause of action under the GLBA. 
 
2.  Social Security Numbers 
 
[17] Social Security numbers were originally created to track workers’ 
earnings for the purpose of Social Security benefits.44  Social Security 
numbers have since become a commonly used personal identifier for many 
other reasons and a report issued by the United States General Accounting 
Office confirms that private sector organizations routinely obtain and use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See C.S. v. United Bank, Inc., No. 2:08-921, 2009 WL 777643, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 
20, 2009) (“[E]very court to considered the issue has found that ‘[n]o private right of 
action exists for an alleged violation of the GLBA.’”) (quoting Dunmire v. Morgan 
Stanley DW, Inc., 475 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 2007)).  
 
42 No. 02 Civ. 4687(NRB), 2003 WL 21692820, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003). 
 
43 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) (Supp. V 2011).  
 
44 See Historical Background and Development of Social Security, U.S. SOC. SECURITY 
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last modified May 16, 2012). 
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Social Security numbers for the purpose of employment screening, credit 
information, and criminal history.45  
 
[18] A number of laws restrict the use or disclosure of a Social Security 
number.  The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”), 
which amended the FCRA, requires consumer reporting agencies and any 
business that uses a consumer report to implement procedures for proper 
disposal of the report information, which includes a Social Security 
number.46  It also stipulates that consumer reporting agencies “truncate” 
the first five digits of the Social Security number and, upon the 
consumer’s request, not include it in the disclosure.47  The GLBA protects 
the privacy of nonpublic personal information, such as a Social Security 
number, by limiting when financial institutions may disclose that 
information to nonaffiliated third parties. 48   The Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act prohibits the obtaining and disclosing of a Social Security 
number from a motor vehicle record except as expressly permitted.49  The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which preserves the 
privacy of an individual’s health information by limiting health care 
organizations from disclosing such information without the patient’s 
consent, safeguards a Social Security number used in medical records.50 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-11, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECUITY, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS: PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES ROUTINELY 
OBTAIN AND USE SSNS, AND LAWS LIMIT THE DISCLOSURE OF THIS INFORMATION 2-3 
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0411.pdf.	  
 
46 See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 
1952, 1985-86 (2003). 
  
47 See 117 Stat. at 1961.  
 
48 See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (2006).  
 
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006).   	  
 
50 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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[19] Because a Social Security number is widely used as an individual 
identifier, the disclosure of a Social Security number entails significant 
harm.  One such harm is identity theft.  Identity theft occurs when an 
impersonator acquires an individual’s Social Security number and uses it 
to commit various illegal activities.51  The Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”)’s website illustrates various types of such fraud.52  One of the 
more common fraudulent activities involves deceiving financial 
institutions and draining the victim’s account.53  Imposters may open new 
credit cards or bank accounts or even clone ATM or debit cards.  
Imposters often use this account information to change a victim’s billing 
address, run up charges, or pay off the imposters’ own bills, and because 
the bills are sent to a different address, the victim may not realize his 
identity is stolen.54  Government documents fraud is also common.55  
Imposters might claim government benefits and file a fraudulent tax 
return.56  They might also get a driver’s license or official ID card issued 
in the victim’s name but with an imposter’s picture.57  Imposters might get 
a job with a falsified identity using the victim’s Social Security number.58  
Another area where imposters frequently commit identity theft is medical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  See About Identity Theft, FIGHTING BACK AGAINST IDENTITY THEFT, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-
theft.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012).	  
 
52  See id.	  
 
53 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY-
DECEMBER 2010, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter CONSUMER SENTINEL BOOK], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-reports/sentinel-cy2010.pdf. 
 
54 See About Identity Theft, supra note 51. 
 
55 See CONSUMER SENTINEL BOOK, supra note 53. 
 
56 See About Identity Theft, supra note 51. 
 
57 See id. 
  
58 See id. 
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services. 59   Imposters might steal personal and health insurance 
information in order to obtain medical treatment, prescription drugs, or 
surgery.60  As a result, a victim’s medical records may change, he may 
receive bills for services he did not receive, or he may reach his insurance 
limits more quickly.61 
 
[20] The number of complaints filed by consumers with various 
organizations illustrates the magnitude of consumer fraud and identity 
theft.62  The Consumer Sentinel Network, the FTC-run online database, 
collects information about such complaints and releases an annual report.63  
According to the report, over 1.3 million complaints were filed in 2010, 
and 250,854 complaints involved identity theft, making it the number one 
complaint category.64  What makes the threat of identity theft so alarming 
is the possibility of multiple identity thefts.  Once an imposter succeeds in 
committing fraud, that success serves to prove his false identity, thereby 
making the second identity theft easier.  Twelve percent of identity theft 
complaints included more then one type of identity theft.65  A recent 
incident in Utah shows how a typical multiple identity theft works.66  In 
May 2011, two men living in Utah were charged with using fraudulent 
Social Security numbers to obtain employment, driver’s license renewals, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Medical Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 1 (Jan. 2010), 
http://ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt10.pdf.  
 
60 See id.  
 
61 See id. at 1-2. 
 
62 See CONSUMER SENTINEL BOOK, supra note 53, at 3. 
 
63 See id. at 2. 
 
64 Id. at 6. 
 
65 See id. at 11 n. 1. 
 
66 See Benjamin Wood, Men charged with identity fraud for using false Social Security 
numbers, KSL.COM (May 26, 2011, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.ksl.com/?nid=960&sid=15702829. 
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and loans.67  They worked for several years under false Social Security 
numbers and obtained totaled more than $206,000.68  Even though they 
were illegal immigrants, they were unrestrained once they established their 
identities and it took a number of years for the police to uncover their 
fraud.69 
 
[21] Despite the seriousness and high likelihood of identity theft, a 
majority of courts have dismissed claims brought by persons whose Social 
Security number was disclosed.70  Such incidents frequently involve a 
debtor who filed bankruptcy.71  In In re Matthys, a debtor who filed 
bankruptcy brought suit against a creditor who failed to redact his Social 
Security number on the proof of claim that allowed anyone with a PACER 
(Public Access to Court Electronic Records) ID to have access to his 
Social Security number.72  The debtor alleged, inter alia, an invasion of 
privacy.73  Dismissing the claim, the Indiana court held that ‘public 
disclosure of private facts,’ one of the four elements required for the 
finding of invasion of privacy under Indiana law, was not established.74  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See id. 
 
68 Id. 
 
69 Id.  
 
70 See, e.g., Matthys v. Green Tree Servicing LLC (In re Matthys), No. 09–16585–AJM–
13, 2010 WL 2176086, at *2-3 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 26, 2010); Carter v. Checkmate, 
Cash Advance Ctrs., Inc. (In re Carter), No. 09–00132–TOM, 2009 WL 3425828, at *3 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. Oct. 23, 2009); Newton v. ACC of Enter., Inc. (In re Newton), No. 08–
1106–DHW, 2009 WL 277437, at *3-5 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Jan. 29, 2009); see also 
Rebecca Rose, Disclosure of Social Security Number Does Not Give Debtors a Private 
Right of Action, ST. JOHN’S UNIV. BANKR. CASE BLOG (Dec. 2010), 
http://stjohns.abiworld.org/node/99. 
 
71 E.g., In re Matthys, 2010 WL 2176086, at *1; In re Newton, 2009 WL 277437, at *1. 
 
72 In re Matthys, 2010 WL 2176086, at *1. 
 
73 Id. at *1, *3. 
 
74 Id. at *3. 
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The court reasoned that the degree of disclosure was not large enough to 
make the disclosure public because only individuals with the PACER ID 
and password could have accessed the debtor’s Social Security number, 
and establishing a new account with PACER would be “a far cry from 
leisurely surfing the net and stumbling upon private information.”75  The 
court viewed registering for a PACER account as an “affirmative [action] 
to seek out the information,” and requiring such an affirmative action did 
not rise to the level of publicity needed to establish an invasion of 
privacy.76	  	  
[22] However, the court ignored the fact that PACER is a website 
designed for public access, as it stands for Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records, and in fact, numerous people have a PACER ID.77  
Persons with PACER ID do not need to take the affirmative action to join 
the site and logging into the PACER with an existing ID would hardly 
constitute an affirmative action.78  Therefore, the debtor’s Social Security 
number was available to everyone with the PACER ID, which is a 
sufficiently large number of people to make this disclosure public.  Thus, 
the court’s assumption that the publicity requirement was not met because 
a membership was required was simply wrong.  Instead, the court should 
have based its decision on whether information was obtainable by a 
sufficiently large number of third parties.  
 
[23] Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, titled “Privacy 
Protection For Filings Made With The Court,” prohibits a disclosure of an 
individual’s full Social Security number.79  It requires that all but the last 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Id. 
 
76 See id.  
 
77 See PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 
78 See PACER On-Line Registration, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/psco/cgi-
bin/regform.pl (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2. 
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four numbers of an individual’s Social Security number be redacted before 
filing the document electronically.80  However, the Indiana court also 
dismissed this claim, reasoning that rules governing federal procedures do 
not give rise to a private right of action.81  Unlike the Indiana court, a 
Minnesota court took a different position.  In Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Linea Latina De Accidentes, Inc., attorneys failed to redact personal 
information on attachments to electronic court filings and improperly 
disclosed birth dates, names of minors, financial account numbers, and at 
least one person’s Social Security number.82  The court, finding a violation 
of Rule 5.2, ordered the defendant to provide each individual whose 
information was compromised with a subscription for credit monitoring 
service.83      
 
[24] Various federal and state governments have outlawed identity 
theft.84  All fifty states have enacted identity theft statutes.85  Most states 
tie penalties to the amount of money the thief steals.86  For example, the 
Florida statute designates identity theft as a second-degree felony if it 
accompanies an injury of $5,000 or more.87  If the injury reaches the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a). 
  
81 In re Matthys, 2010 WL 2176086, at *3.  
 
82 No. 09-3681(JNE/JJK), 2010 WL 5014386, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010). 
 
83 See id. at *3.  
 
84 See Federal Laws: Criminal, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/law-enforcement/federal-laws-
criminal.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (identifying federal identity theft law); State 
Laws: Criminal, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/law-enforcement/state-laws-criminal.html 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (listing all states and federal territories that classify identity 
theft as criminal conduct).	  
 
85 See State Laws: Criminal, supra note 84. 
 
86 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568 (West 2010). 
 
87 Id. § 817.568(2)(b). 
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$50,000 threshold, it becomes a first-degree felony.88  At the federal level, 
Congress enacted the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 
1998 (“Identity Theft Act”).89  The Act makes it a federal crime for 
anyone who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to 
commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that 
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under 
any applicable State or local law.”90  In addition, the Identity Theft Penalty 
Enhancement Act amends the federal criminal code to establish penalties 
for aggravated identity theft in addition to the existing punishments for 
related felonies.91  This includes instances when identity theft has been 
used as one step in a process of more serious crimes, such as terrorist acts, 
immigration violations, and firearms offenses.92  The Act adds two to five 
years to the sentences of violators.93 
 	  
[25] However, because it does not allow a private right of action, the 
Act has a limited effect in remedying the harm of affected individuals.94  
In Garay v. U.S. Bancorp, the customer, Garay, brought an action against 
U.S. Bancorp alleging the aiding and abetting of identity theft under the 
Identity Theft Act.95  The bank issued a credit card to an impersonator of 
Garay and the imposter incurred over $20,000 in charges, leaving his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Id. § 817.568(2)(c). 
 
89 Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998).	  
 
90 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006). 
 
91 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2006). 
 
92 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c). 
 
93 Id. § 1028A(a). 
 
94 See generally id. § 1028A(a) (prescribing imprisonment as punishment for violating 
the statute).  
 
95 303 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (E.D.N.Y.  2004). 
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account delinquent.96  Deciding for the bank, the court concluded that no 
private right of action exists under the Act, nor did Garay set forth any 
basis establishing that Congress intended to provide a private right of 
action under the statute.97 	  	  
[26] Although the federal law does not allow a private right of action, 
some states have enacted comprehensive anti-identity theft laws.98  For 
example, the state of California permits victims to obtain the fraudulent 
applications completed by the identify thief as well as a record of the 
thief’s transactions carried out in the victim’s name.99  California also 
assists victims in stopping debt collectors from continuing to try to collect 
debts that the thief incurred.100  
 
[27] A Social Security number is an essential piece of personal 
information because it is one of the most widely used individual identifiers 
and is necessary to engage in financial transactions.101  Disclosure of a 
security number is likely to lead to an identity theft where an imposter 
drains a victim’s account or damages the victim’s credit.  Despite the close 
connection between the disclosure of a Social Security number and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Id. at 301. 
 
97 Id. at 302 (finding that the statute is criminal in nature and it is “’a general precept of 
criminal law that unless the statute specifically authorizes a private right of action, none 
exists’” (quoting Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 465, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998))). 
 
98 See Identity Theft State Statutes, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/identity-theft-state-statutes.aspx (last 
updated July 23, 2012) (noting that twenty-nine states have specific restitution provisions 
for identity theft). 
 
99 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.8(a) (2006); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.95(a) (2002).  
 
100 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.18 (West 2008). 
 
101 See generally Avoid Identity Theft: Protect Social Security Numbers, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/phila/ProtectingSSNs.htm (last updated June 6, 
2012) (identifying the SSN as a crucial piece of information for many organizations). 
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resulting financial loss, federal laws do not allow an individual to recover 
loss from an entity who negligently mishandled the individual’s Social 
Security number, thereby exposing an individual to a higher degree of 
harm.102 
 
B.  Medical Information 
 
[28] Medical information is information that exists in connection with 
an individual’s physical and mental health condition in addition to records 
regarding treatments and prescriptions.  Because medical information is 
processed by various entities, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) broadly defines “protected health 
information.”103	  	  
[29] Protected health information is information created or received by 
a covered entity (e.g. health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health 
care providers) or its business associates (e.g. billing services, accountants 
or collection agencies) that identifies an individual and relates to that 
individual’s health condition, receipt of health care, or payment for the 
provision of the individual’s health care services.104  Such information is 
protected health information regardless of whether it relates to a physical 
or mental health condition or whether that health condition existed in the 
past, exists in the present, or will exist in the future.105  Similarly, 
protected health information includes information concerning the payment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006) (indicating that an entity must “knowingly 
mishandle” an individual’s social security number before it is liable for damages). 
 
103 See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2019, 2022.  HIPAA was reformed by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that was signed into law on March 23, 
2010.  Although some definitions under HIPAA were revised, this paper aims to merely 
illustrate exemplary definitions of medical information and finds the HIPAA’s definitions 
appropriate for this purpose.  
 
104 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011) (defining “business associate” and “covered entity”).   
 
105 See id. 
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of health care services provided to an individual irrespective of when the 
health care was or will be provided.106	  
 	  
[30] While protected health information is an established definition 
under HIPAA’s privacy and confidentiality provisions, for the purpose of 
this article, medical information is limited to pure medical records—such 
as history of hospital visits, drug prescription records, or health insurance 
claims—because certain information under protected health information 
falls into other categories examined in this article.   
  
[31] Among the various types of potential harm caused by the 
disclosure of medical information, there is at least one situation in which 
such a disclosure poses a unique threat: the loss of an employment 
opportunity.  In Diering v. Regional West Medical Center, the hospital's 
emergency room director told a potential new employer that Diering, an 
emergency room physician, had undergone voluntary drug and alcohol 
treatments without seeking Diering’s consent to disclose that 
information.107  As a result, the potential employer decided not to hire 
Diering and Diering sued the hospital for a violation of HIPAA.108  
However, the Nebraska court dismissed the case, reiterating that a 
wrongful disclosure in violation of HIPAA does not create a private cause 
of action.109  Although this case does not concern a data breach because 
the director was in a position to know about Diering’s health information, 
it involves the unauthorized use of medical information that would result 
from a data breach, illustrating a situation where such misuse cost the 
plaintiff a job, but the law failed to mitigate such harm.110   
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 See id.  
 
107 No. 7:06CV5010, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66102, at *3-4 (D. Neb. Sept. 15, 2006).  
 
108 Id. at *3, *8. 
 
109 Id. at *8-9. 
 
110 See id. at *3. 
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[32] However, the likelihood of such harm is relatively low because not 
everyone has health issues detrimental to work performance, whereas 
almost everyone has financially sensitive information.  In addition, fewer 
incentives exist for an imposter to abuse medical information.  By taking 
advantage of an individual’s financially sensitive information, an imposter 
could make the individual pay for services and irresponsible expenditures 
enjoyed by the imposter, whereas harm due to the abuse of medical 
information would arise only if an individual’s employer becomes aware 
of the individual’s health problems.  The probability of an employer 
knowing and using his employee’s ill health conditions against the 
employee is tenuous in comparison to the threat of exploiting financially 
sensitive information.  
  
[33] Another harm that a disclosure of medical information implicates 
is emotional distress because strong negative social stigma is attached to 
certain medical conditions.  Such conditions encompass problems range 
from drug and alcohol abuse to positive HIV diagnoses.  Setting aside the 
high insurance premiums that people with these health issues have to pay, 
if they can get insurance, disclosures of their medical conditions would 
cause emotional distress, and yet again, the law fails to mitigate such 
harm.111  
  
[34] In Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper, Cooper was a 
recreational pilot from San Francisco who had been diagnosed as HIV-
positive.112  When he renewed his pilot license in the mid-1990s, he 
unlawfully withheld his diagnosis from the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) because he feared discrimination based on his 
medical condition and by implication, his sexual orientation as a 
homosexual man.113  When the FAA obtained confidential information 
from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) that Cooper had been a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 See generally Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (failing to list emotional 
distress as a harm that calls for an award of damages). 
 
112 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1446 (2012). 
 
113 Id. 
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long-term recipient of disability benefits because of his HIV, it launched 
an investigation.114  Subsequently, Cooper’s license was revoked and he 
was charged with making false statements to the federal government.115  
Cooper ultimately pled guilty to one count of making and delivering a 
false official writing.116  He then sued the FAA for violating the Privacy 
Act.117  The Act prohibits the disclosure of information maintained in 
systems by federal agencies absent the written consent of the subject 
individual and permits claims for actual damages.118  Cooper claimed that 
he suffered from severe mental distress after the SSA disclosed his HIV-
positive status in violation of the Act.119  The case, after conflicting 
decisions from lower courts, proceeded to the Supreme Court where the 
Justices contemplated whether actual damages were limited to monetary 
loss or could include mental distress.120  On March 28, 2012, the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision, holding that actual damages within the 
meaning of the Privacy Act do not include damages for emotional distress 
and are limited to out-of-pocket financial losses.121 
    
[35] Disclosures of medical information can be irreparable because they 
could result in a loss of employment and emotional distress due to a 
negative social stigma.  However, such disclosures are less frequent and 
the likelihood of disclosures is lower than that of financially sensitive 
information.  This renders the impact of a disclosure of medical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Id. at 1446-47. 
 
115 Id. 1447. 
 
116 Id. 
 
117 Fed. Aviation Admin., 132 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 
118 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).   
 
119 See Fed. Aviation Admin., 132 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 
120 Id. at 1446. 
 
121 Id. at 1456.  
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information on an individual’s financial well being less direct, thereby 
making medical information less valuable than financially sensitive 
information. 
   
C.  Socially Accepted Disclosable Information 
 
[36] Socially accepted disclosable information concerns information 
that is open to the public or that is relatively easy to obtain.  There are two 
types of socially accepted disclosable information:  direct socially 
accepted disclosable information and indirect socially accepted disclosable 
information.  Direct socially accepted disclosable information is 
information that directly leads to an individual, such as name, address, 
email address, date of birth, and phone number.  On the other hand, 
indirect socially accepted disclosable information is information that 
shows an individual’s character, traits, or preferences.  It is not directly 
linked to an individual, but it is highly sought-after information because it 
is useful for advertisements.  The scope of disclosures this article focuses 
on concerning socially accepted disclosable information does not include 
transferring information between affiliated parties.  Although such 
information sharing is a sharply debated issue, it is different from 
disclosures due to data breaches and the dissemination of information 
without permission. 
  
1.  Direct Socially Accepted Disclosable Information 
 
[37] Direct socially accepted disclosable information is more or less 
public.  A person’s name and contact information are frequently, even 
sometimes voluntarily, disclosed online.122  Disclosures of direct socially 
accepted disclosable information might bring benefits because individuals 
can build and expand networks based on educational or geographical 
background.  However, this does not mean that there is no harm created by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 See Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal 
Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. 
& TECH. 91, 93, 95 (2009) (analyzing the collection and dissemination of personal 
identifiable information and the legal protections available concerning online privacy). 
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such disclosure.  A disclosure of direct socially accepted disclosable 
information is likely, if not certain, to lead to unsolicited marketing.123  
This is demonstrated by the multitude of spam in one’s emails and the 
continuous telephoning by automated robo-calls.  Unsolicited marketing is 
not only annoying, but also dangerous because hackers often disguise 
themselves as unsolicited marketers to succeed in stealing personal 
information.124  Although such harm is frequent and probable, courts have 
generally viewed the disclosure of direct socially accepted disclosable 
information as not constituting a cognizable harm.125 
 
[38] In Allison v. Aetna, Inc., the defendant’s online job application 
database, which stored information about 450,000 applicants, was hacked 
and the plaintiff who had uploaded his personal information, including his 
resume, sued the website.126  An investigation revealed that unauthorized 
individuals had access to emails, yet it was unclear whether any other 
information was exposed.127  The plaintiff contended that people “‘face a 
significant risk of identity theft, evidenced by . . . [t]he hackers’ efforts to 
extract personal information from [victims] via sending phishing email 
messages.’”128  Nevertheless, the court dismissed the case for failure to 
allege actual harm, reasoning that “even assuming that the hackers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Cf. Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Information 
from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1501 
(2001). 
 
124 See id. 
 
125 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Hinton v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., No. 09-594, 2009 WL 704139, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 16, 2009) (finding that plaintiff, who claimed that his credit information was 
compromised in an electronic database breach but alleging no misuse, failed to state an 
actual or imminent injury-in-fact). 
 
126 No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9. 2010). 
 
127 Id. 
 
128 Id. at *5 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
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obtained Plaintiff’s email address, it is highly speculative that they 
obtained any other information that would be necessary to commit identity 
theft.”129 
  
[39] However, one California court created an exception by allowing a 
case to survive a motion to dismiss.  In Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., the 
defendant company RockYou developed and published online applications 
for social networking sites.130  Customers signed up by providing a valid 
email address and registration password, which RockYou then stored in its 
database. 131   Many customers were also required to provide their 
Facebook or MySpace usernames and passwords in order to use 
RockYou's applications. 132   Although RockYou promised to protect 
customers’ information using “commercially reasonable physical, 
managerial, and technical safeguards,” RockYou did not encrypt 
information and its vulnerable data security enticed hackers to break into 
its database.133  The court noted that customers sufficiently alleged “the 
breach . . . caused [customers] to lose some ascertainable but unidentified 
‘value’ and/or property right inherent in the [personally identifiable 
information],"134 and let the case move forward based on breach of 
contract, breach of implied contract, and negligence claims.135	  
 	  
[40] Furthermore, a recent California Supreme Court decision points to 
the conclusion that a court can find value in Personally Identifiable 
Information.  In Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, a customer sued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Id.  
 
130 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 858 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 
131 Id. 
 
132 Id.  
 
133 Id.  
 
134 Id. at 865.  
 
135 RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d at 864-66. 
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Williams-Sonoma Stores, alleging that its business practice of collecting 
customers’ zip codes violated California’s Song-Beverly Credit Card 
Act.136  The Act prohibits requesting or requiring personally identifiable 
information during a credit card transaction and imposes a civil penalty of 
up to $1,000 per violation.137  The court described the Act’s extensive 
legislative history and intent, which reflected California’s strong objection 
to retailers who acquire customers’ information for their business purposes, 
such as to build mailing and telephone lists for in-house marketing efforts, 
or to sell customers’ information to direct-mail or telemarketing 
specialists.138  Siding with the customer, the court found that a customer’s 
zip code constitutes Personally Identifiable Information, and thus, 
concluded that the stores violated the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act.139  
This decision marks a significant achievement in privacy laws in the sense 
that the court acknowledged, for the first time since the enactment of the 
Act in 1971, the inherent value in Personally Identifiable Information and 
the harm posed by unsolicited marketing.140  
  
[41] While the court’s decision in Pindea supports California’s policy 
against information collection and provides a significant step toward 
protecting Personally Identifiable Information, the court failed to consider 
the commercial benefits of disclosure.  By asking for zip codes instead of 
exact addresses, a business could develop a store in the area where many 
customers reside, which would invariably benefit the customers.  A 
business could also accurately reflect preferences of a surrounding 
neighborhood and adequately supply products that the customers want.  In 
addition, the court ignored that customers could falsify their information 
and businesses would be ill equipped to verify given information.  Also, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 246 P.3d 612, 614 (Cal. 2011).   
 
137  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08 (West 2011). 
  
138 See Pineda, 246 P.3d at 619-20. 
 
139 Id. at 620.  
 
140 See id. at 618-20. 
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businesses cannot compel customers to provide their information when 
they refuse to do so, yet the court found for the plaintiff in Pineda who 
merely asserted that she furnished information, “[b]elieving it necessary to 
complete the transaction.”141  Hence, it is unfair to punish a business 
solely because it requested customers’ information when the accuracy of 
information could be questioned and it is shortsighted not to take into 
account the benefits of requiring customers’ information.  
 
[42] Recognizing the severe disturbances and troubles caused by 
unsolicited marketing, Congress enacted several statutes to manage and 
control it.142  The Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography 
and Marketing Act (“CAN-SPAM Act”) regulates spam mails.143 The 
CAN-SPAM Act applies to all commercial e-mails, which are defined as 
messages with “the primary purpose of . . . the commercial advertisement 
or promotion of a commercial product or service,” 144  and prohibits 
knowingly sending commercial messages with the intent to deceive or 
mislead recipients.145  The CAN-SPAM Act also requires senders of 
commercial emails to include clear and conspicuous explanations of how 
the recipients can opt out of getting emails in the future and to promptly 
honor opt-out requests.146  Parties cannot avoid legal responsibilities since 
the Act defines a “sender” to include both the company whose product is 
promoted and the company that actually sends the message, thereby 
holding both of them legally accountable.147  Parties who violate the Act 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Id. at 614. 
 
142 See, e.g., Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-
SPAM) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006); Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 227 (2006); Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (2006). 
 
143 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006). 
 
144 Id. § 7702(2)(A). 
 
145 Id. § 7705(a). 
 
146 Id. § 7704(a)(3)-(4). 
 
147 Id. § 7702(16).  
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may be subject to civil penalties up to $1 million148 and criminal penalties 
up to five years of imprisonment.149  The FTC vigorously enforces the 
CAN-SPAM Act.150  For example, Jumpstart Technologies was fined 
$900,000 when the subject lines of their business’s emails falsely 
indicated that a recipient's friend was sending free tickets and many people 
who tried to opt out of the promotion continued to receive similar emails 
for weeks afterward.151   
 	  
[43] In addition, Congress passed the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act (“TCPA”) in response to the growing number of marketing calls to 
consumers’ homes and the increasing use of automated and prerecorded 
messages.152  The TCPA permits individuals to sue a telemarketer in small 
claims court for the actual loss incurred or up to $500, whichever is 
greater.153  Further, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
created a national do-not-call registry in which individuals may add their 
phone numbers to avoid receiving telemarketing calls.154	  
  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3) (2006). 
 
149 Id. § 7704(d)(5). 
 
150 Id. § 7705(c); see, e.g., FTC v. Cleverlink Trading Ltd., 519 F. Supp. 2d 784, 786, 800 
(N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 
151 See United States v. Jumpstart Tech., LLC, No. C-06-2079 (MHP) (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 
2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423176/0423176JumpstartTechnologiesConsentDecree.p
df.	  
 
152 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 102-317, at 2, 5-6 (1991). 
  
153 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(B) (2006).  
 
154 See Do Not Call List, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/do-
not-call-list (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 1 	  
	   30	  
2.  Indirect Socially Accepted Disclosable Information 
 
[44] While direct socially accepted disclosable information is somewhat 
public in its nature, indirect socially accepted disclosable information is 
more private.  It has emerged in the wake of the Internet.  The enormous 
growth of data processing and storage capability enables database 
operators to collect consumer information and incentivizes its use because 
more information creates a more accurate profile, which allows more 
precisely targeted advertisements. 155   This is called behavioral 
advertising.156  The FTC Staff Report illustrates an example of behavioral 
advertising as follows: a consumer living in Washington, D.C. searches 
for a flight ticket to New York City through a travel website, but he does 
not purchase a ticket. 157   Later, when the consumer visits a local 
newspaper website, he receives advertisements featuring tickets from 
Washington, D.C. to New York City.158  This is made possible by a 
network advertiser.  The network advertiser places a cookie, a file used to 
send information from a user’s browser back to a website, on the 
consumer’s computer. 159   Unbeknownst to the consumer, the cookie 
collects information about web pages that the consumer visited and sends 
it to the network adviser.160  Then, the adviser provides such information 
to affiliated parties such as the newspaper website.161  When the consumer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf. 
 
156 Id. 
 
157 Id. at 3. 
 
158 See id. 
 
159 See id. 
 
160 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR 
ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 155, at 3. 
 
161 See id. 
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visits the newspaper website, the cookie identifies the consumer and 
directs the newspaper website to show advertisements about a flight to 
New York City.162  
  
[45] Behavioral advertising creates a serious privacy issue.  For 
example, Sears and Kmart retail Internet websites disseminated cookies 
and collected personal information on customers’ Internet activity.163  
Unlike its initial representation, the cookies collected information about 
the contents of shopping carts, online bank statements, drug prescription 
records, video rental records, library borrowing histories, and e-mails.164  
Another tool of behavioral advertising is selling disguised spyware.  
CyberSpy Software, LLC sold a spyware program called RemoteSpy.165  
The program provided detailed instructions on how to disguise the 
spyware as an innocuous file so that a person using a computer with the 
program installed would not recognize that his information was being 
provided to a third-party.166  Once installed, the program recorded every 
website visited, captured images of the computer screen, and even 
obtained passwords.167  CyberSpy’s website kept the gathered information 
and delivered it to the purchaser of the program.168 	  
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See id. 
 
163 Complaint at ¶ 4, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., (2009) (No. C-4264), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/090604searscmpt.pdf.	  
 
164 Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. 
 
165 See FTC v. CyberSpy Software, LLC, No. 608-CV-1872-ORL-31GJK, 2009 WL 
2386137, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2009). 
 
166 See Court Orders Halt to Sale of Spyware, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/11/cyberspy.shtm. 
 
167 Id.  
 
168 Id.  	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[46] Fighting this deceptive behavioral advertising, the FTC has 
vigorously enforced Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.169  
Enacted in 1914, the Act asserts the unlawfulness of unfair methods of 
competition and deceptive acts or practices.170  Empowered by Section 5 
of the Act, the FTC issues an order to cease and desist when it has reason 
to believe that entities have violated the Act.171  The FTC may seek civil 
penalties up to $10,000 per violation of the order.172  
  
[47] Two Internet giants were recently prosecuted under Section 5 of 
the Act.  Google faced charges that its social network, Google Buzz, 
violated the company’s own privacy policies and used deceptive 
tactics.173  The FTC alleged that Google used information collected from 
Gmail users to generate and populate Google Buzz.174  Google Buzz 
automatically enrolled users in some features of the network regardless of 
whether they opted out and an auto-follow option automatically added 
Gmail users’ most-emailed contacts as publicly visible friends on the 
network.175  Facebook was also charged with a similar violation.176  It 
made information public that users had deemed to be private on their 
Facebook pages without warning its users or seeking consent.177  Both 
Google and Facebook settled with the FTC, agreeing to conduct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 CyberSpy Software, 2009 WL 2386137, at *1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)). 
 
170 15 U.S.C § 45(a) (2006). 
 
171 Id. § 45(b). 
 
172 Id. § 45(m)(1)(B). 
 
173 See In re Google Inc., No. C-4336, 2011 WL 5089551, at *1-5 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011).	  
 
174 Id. at *2. 
 
175 Id. at *2, *4. 
 
176 See In re Facebook Inc., No. C-4365, 2012 WL 3518628, at *2-3 (F.T.C. July 27, 
2012).	  
 
177 Id. at *6. 
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independent privacy audits every other year for the next twenty years.178  
A future violation of the terms of the settlement would cost them $16,000 
a day for each count.179	  
 	  
[48] Another example of a law punishing intentional and unauthorized 
access to a computer is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1996 
(“CFAA”).180  Originally enacted in 1984 as a part of the Crime Control 
Act, the CFAA was the first statute to address computer crime 
specifically.181  Section 1030(a) is one of the most common sources of 
claims under the CFAA.182  This section prohibits (1) intentional, (2) 
unauthorized access to a computer or access exceeding authorization, (3) 
accomplished through an interstate or foreign communication, (4) that 
leads to the acquisition of information from a protected computer.183  A 
“protected computer” is defined as a computer used by the federal 
government, a financial institution, or one that is used in interstate or 
foreign commerce or communication.184  The CFAA allows a civil action 
to obtain compensatory damages or “loss,” but it has a $5,000 minimum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Id. at *81; In re Google Inc., 2011 WL 5089551, at *10. 
 
179 In re Facebook, Inc., 2012 WL 3518628, at *83. 
 
180 See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 
181 See H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET. AL, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER 
CRIMES 1 (Feb. 2007), available at 
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damage requirement during any single year.185  “Loss” includes costs of 
responding to the offense, conducting a damage assessment, restoring the 
system and data to their condition before the offense, and lost revenue or 
cost incurred because of the interruption of service. 186   However, 
collection of personal data is not generally prosecuted under the CFAA 
since it cannot meet the threshold of damage requirement. 
  
[49] Nevertheless, disclosures of indirect socially accepted disclosable 
information may generate benefits.  At a personal level, people find 
friends over social network media and build relationships with people who 
share a similar background or interests.  Social benefits are also obtained 
because businesses can develop better products or services.  The caller ID 
is a product of such efforts.  Caller ID was introduced when telephone 
companies shifted the use of telephone numbers from mere use in 
completing calls to also providing identification to the recipient.187  Now it 
has become one of the most convenient services, allowing recipients to 
selectively receive calls and avoid unwanted contact. 188   ‘Amazon 
Recommendation’ is another example of efforts to develop better products 
and services.  Amazon uses customers’ purchasing and browsing history 
to create recommendations and provide customized suggestions, which 
have made it easier for customers to locate products that they may need.189  
This has substantially increased sales as well.190   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 See id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (Supp. V 2010). 
 
186 See id. § 1030(e)(11). 
 
187 Public Comment on Preliminary FTC Staff Report from Michael Richter, Chief 
Privacy Counsel, Facebook, to Fed. Trade Comm’n  7 (Feb. 18, 2011) [hereinafter 
Facebook Comment], available at 
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[50] Court judgment records are another example of indirect socially 
accepted disclosable information.  Unless sealed, court records are public 
records and accessible to the public.191  However, a private aspect of court 
judgments presents a privacy issue.  One such example is a criminal 
record.  Regardless of whether a person committed a felony or a 
misdemeanor, a person is reluctant to disclose his criminal records 
because it might damage his public reputation.  The same applies to 
bankruptcy and restraining orders.  
  
[51] Although it is true that court judgments have some private aspects, 
disclosures of court judgments cannot constitute harm because their 
benefits to society outweigh individual harm.  Disclosures of criminal 
records serve to lawfully disqualify unfit people to carry out certain jobs.  
Many employers conduct pre-employment background checks.  
Employers conduct background checks to avoid claims of liability for 
negligent hiring, which allege that a hired employee with a criminal record 
harmed others, all of which could have been avoided by a criminal record 
check.192  For example, child molesters can create liability by working at 
schools and persons with violent criminal records can create liability by 
becoming police officers. 	  
 	  
[52] In addition to criminal records, bankruptcy also provides a 
legitimate reason for a private employer to refuse to hire an individual.  In 
Myers v. TooJay’s Management Corp., a potential employee, who had 
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy sued an employer under the Bankruptcy 
Code’s antidiscrimination provision because the employer rescinded an 
offer after finding out about the employee’s bankruptcy record.193  The 
court ruled in favor of the employer, relying on the plain language of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 See generally 8 FED. PROC., LAW. EDITION § 20:240 (stating that there is both a 
common-law presumption of, and constitutional right to, court records).  
 
192 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965); Stacy A. Hickox, 
Employer Liability for Negligent Hiring of Ex-Offenders, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1002 
(2011) (discussing employer liability for harm caused by their employees).  
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provision.194  Section 525 of the Code prescribes that a government entity 
may not deny employment due to bankruptcy whereas no private party 
may terminate employment due to bankruptcy. 195   In other words, 
bankruptcy has no bearing whatsoever on government related jobs, but it 
could serve as a reasonable basis for private companies to refuse to hire an 
employee although firing an employee because of bankruptcy is forbidden.  
Due to conspicuously different language, the court inferred Congress’s 
intent to limit the antidiscrimination provision to a government entity and 
concluded that the statutes did not provide a cause of action against a 
private employer for an individual who was denied employment due to 
bankruptcy.196	  
 	  
III. HOW TO JUSTIFY COMPENSATION 
 
[53] In the absence of statutes expressly penalizing a database operator 
for a security breach, the best and most probable claim that individual 
victims can assert is negligence.  The tort negligence rule requires proof of 
four elements: (1) duty of care, (2) breach of duty, (3) causation, and (4) 
actual harm.197  However, data breach cases usually fail to pass the 
threshold for negligence because they do not satisfy requirements for 
breach of duty and harm.  Because hacking techniques continue to develop 
and become increasingly sophisticated, a data breach could occur no 
matter how diligent a database operator is in safeguarding information, 
with even the most attentive operator not being able to completely prevent 
hackers from stealing data.  Without breach of duty, the database operator 
is not liable.  To this end, this article suggests the imposition of strict 
liability because data collection constitutes ultrahazardous activity with 
substantial utility, yet with the inevitable byproduct of a data breach.  Also, 
strict liability is appropriate because it would optimize the extent of data 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Id. at 1284-85. 
 
195 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)-(b) (2006). 
  
196 See Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283-84.  
 
197 See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 71 (2004).  
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collection since database operators, knowing they would have to bear the 
costs of their activities, would adjust the amount of data they store in 
proportion to their levels of security.  In addition, it is equitable in the 
sense that database operators are the least cost avoiders as opposed to 
individual victims.  
  
[54] With regard to the harm requirement, medical malpractice cases 
are illuminating.  A lack of actual harm often undermines both a medical 
malpractice and a data breach case.  Although a patient would be afraid of 
developing an illness, just as a victim of a data breach would be worried 
about a threat of future identity theft or monetary losses, both are not 
cognizable harm under the traditional tort analysis.198  However, courts in 
medical malpractice cases have expanded the definition of actionable 
injury, ruling that the possibility of future damage is sufficient to warrant 
compensation.199  Furthermore, courts in environmental toxic tort cases 
have recognized emotional distress as actionable injury, finding distress 
originating from a fear of future injury is reasonably related to negligent 
action.200 
 
A.  Expanding the Traditional Tort Rule: A Threat of Future 
Injury as Actual Harm 
 
[55] Medical malpractice cases are similar to data breach cases in that 
often there is no identifiable present injury.  In a medical malpractice case, 
a typical plaintiff suffers an increased risk of future injury, yet the court 
dismisses the case until the plaintiff can reasonably be diagnosed with an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding no 
cognizable injury for threat of data breach with no damages).  See generally Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (stating that allegations of a future 
injury at some indefinite time fails to qualify as an “actual or imminent injury”). 
 
199 See, e.g., Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 478 (Wash. 
1983) (concluding that claim was sufficient if negligence increased the risk of injury). 
 
200 See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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actual illness.201  Similarly, the majority of courts in data breach cases 
have ruled that a threat of future injury does not satisfy the requirement for 
awarding damages. 202  Loss of time and money spent monitoring a 
victim’s credit does not suffice because the victim’s expenditures were 
“not the result of any present injury, but rather the anticipation of future 
injury that has not yet materialized.”203  The threat or receipt of unwanted 
e-mails has also been held to not constitute an injury.204  
  
[56] However, some courts hearing medical malpractice cases have 
taken a step toward redefining actual harm.  In Herskovits v. Group Health 
Cooperative of Puget Sound, the defendant physician negligently failed to 
diagnose the decedent’s cancer. 205   This misdiagnosis resulted in a 
statistically demonstrable reduction in the decedent’s chance of 
survival.206  The Washington Supreme Court viewed the reduction of a 
chance of survival as a compensable injury even though the decedent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 See Herber v. Johns Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd Cir. 1986) (“A future injury, 
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Cent. Gulf R.R., 370 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (As a general rule, possible 
future damages are not compensable unless they are reasonably certain to occur) (citing 
Lauth v. Chi. Union Traction Co., 91 N.E. 431, 434 (Ill. 1977)). 
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2d 684, 690-91 (S.D. Ohio 2006); Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 (JBS), 
2006 WL 2177036, at *4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006). 
 
203 Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 
(quoting Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 
2006)).  
 
204 See Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 4:06CV00485-WRW, 2006 WL 2850042, at *2 (E.D. 
Ark. Oct. 3, 2006).  
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already had a less than fifty percent chance of survival.207  The court held 
that the plaintiff did not have to introduce evidence showing that the 
negligence resulted in injury or death, but “simply that the negligence 
increased the risk of injury or death.”208 
    
[57] Furthermore, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to apply the 
traditional tort rule to a patient because it would bring about an inequitable 
result.  In Petriello v. Kalman, the plaintiff was sixteen weeks pregnant 
when her child died in utero.209  While performing a dilatation, the 
defendant doctor negligently punctured the plaintiff’s uterus.210  Although 
the scar tissue did not cause any medical problems, the plaintiff’s experts 
testified that the presence of the scar tissue created an increased risk of 
future bowel obstruction.211  The Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
traditional tort rule was “inconsistent with the goal of compensating tort 
victims for all the consequences of the injuries they have sustained,”212 
and awarded damages for increased risk of injury.213  
  
[58] Moreover, applying the negligence rationale in data breach cases 
fails to fulfill goals of the tort system.  The tort system is said to have 
three primary objectives: (1) compensation, (2) deterrence, and (3) 
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medical expenses, etc.”). 
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corrective justice.214  “Compensation is provided to plaintiffs who can 
demonstrate that they were harmed by the activities of others,” and 
“[d]eterrence is achieved through the threat of financial liability [because] 
economically rational actors are forced to take into account the impact of 
their activities on others.” 215   Corrective justice demands that those 
responsible for harming others restore the harmed persons to their pre-
injury status.216  However, no such punishment is accomplished in data 
breach cases.  The negligence liability tosses out data breach cases for lack 
of actual harm, leaving victims of data breach cases often, if not always, 
uncompensated.  Consequently, database operators are not required to bear 
any costs and they have no reason to take steps to prevent future breaches.  
Additionally, the nature of data breach cases makes it inherently difficult 
to achieve corrective justice.  Corrective justice for data breach cases 
requires the creation of new personal information for the wronged party 
because personally identifiable information, once disclosed, is impossible 
to return to a pre-disclosure status, yet creating new information is not 
within the tortfeasor’s discretion.  
  
[59] Just as medical malpractice cases are instructive in proving harm, 
environmental toxic tort cases shed light on the demonstration of actual 
harm in data breach cases.  Albert Lin succinctly describes barriers to a 
plaintiff’s recovery in toxic tort cases as follows: 
 
The characteristics of environmental toxic injuries 
complicate efficient liability determinations.  These injuries 
tend to involve a large number of persons exposed to 
significant, albeit low, probability risks.  A long latency 
period between exposure and illness and multiple alternate 	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causes of illness exacerbate this causation problem.  These 
difficulties, combined with the costs of litigation, result in 
the systematic undercompensation of environmental tort 
victims and the systematic underdeterrence of polluters.217 
  
[60] Similarly, a typical data breach case involves thousands of people.  
The largest data breach ever reported is the Heartland Payment System 
breach in 2009, which resulted in 130 million records lost.218  Last year, 
Sony, the electronic giant, made national news, not for its new products, 
but for data breaches that resulted in the hacking of seventy-seven million 
records.219  These breaches compromised Sony’s Play Station Network, 
Qriocity music, video service, and Sony’s Online Entertainment service, 
with the expected cost of the breaches reaching at least $171 million.220  
Nonetheless, it is uncertain when this breach will result in actual harm and 
even if harm occurs, whether this incident caused such harm because, 
unbeknownst to the victims, their information could have been leaked 
somewhere else. 
  
[61] In addition, victims of environmental toxic torts and data breaches 
tend to suffer emotional distress.221  Intuitively, it is understandable for an 	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218 See Nathan Yau, Largest Data Breaches of All Time, FLOWING DATA (June 13, 2011), 
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221 See Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (S.D. Ohio 2007) 
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damages, including psychological or emotional distress’” (citing Stollenwerk v. Tri-West 
Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005 WL 2465906, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 
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toxic tort law). 
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individual to fear the development of an illness after exposure to toxic 
substances.  Moreover, courts have found that such emotional distress, 
even without physical illness, warrants compensation.222  For example, in 
Hagerty v. L & & Marine Services, Inc. the plaintiff was drenched with 
dripolene, a toxic chemical containing benzene, toluene, and xyolene.223  
The court noted that the plaintiff’s present fear constituted a present fact of 
mental anguish that could be included in recoverable damages and 
concluded that “[w]ith or without physical injury or impact, a plaintiff is 
entitled to recover damages for serious mental distress arising from fear of 
developing cancer where his fear is reasonable and causally related to the 
defendant’s negligence.”224  
  
[62] A fear for future harm resulting from a data breach is no less 
reasonable than that of an environmental toxic tort.  A recent study shows 
that a victim of a data breach faces a chance of identity theft that is four 
times higher than those who were not victims of data breaches.225  Javelin 
Strategy and Research, a private research institute, surveyed about 5,000 
American consumers in 2009 and found that 19.5% of those who received 
a data breach notification were later victimized, compared to 4.3% who 
did not get such a letter but were victimized.226  Logically and empirically, 
it is clear that a data breach increases the likelihood of harm, thereby 
rendering fear for future harm sufficiently reasonable to warrant 
compensation. 
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B.  Beyond the Traditional Tort Approach: Data Collection as 
an Ultrahazardous Activity 
 
[63] Compensating losses when a database operator is not at fault poses 
another problem.  Rapid and innovative technologies are a double-edged 
sword with respect to an individual’s privacy.  Database operators have 
developed a remarkably convenient and reliable system so that individuals 
can engage in various transactions over the Internet, yet the very same 
technological advances render no security system impeccable.  As one 
news article reports, nothing is truly secure on the Internet.227  With ever 
increasing financial incentives to steal personal information, numerous 
data breaches have occurred and they will continue to occur no matter how 
database operators exercise diligence, yet the traditional negligence tort 
liability is ill equipped to deal with such problems.    
  
[64] Beyond the traditional tort approach, Danielle Citron provides a 
noteworthy analysis.228  She defines security breaches as “an inevitable 
byproduct” and a residual risk of collecting sensitive personal information 
because no amount of due care will prevent data breaches.229  She argues 
that negligence will never deter database operators from taking adequate 
precautions because they need not pay for the cost and risks of their 
activity under the traditional negligence rule.230  In response, she argues 
for strict liability for harm caused by data breaches: 
    
The high levels of residual risk suggest treating cyber-
reservoirs as ultrahazardous activities—those with 
significant social utility and significant risk—that warrant 	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strict liability.  As Judge Richard Posner has explained, 
ultrahazardous activities often involve something “new” 
that society has “little experience” securing, where neither 
the injurer nor victim can prevent the accident by taking 
greater care.  This characterized water reservoirs in 
nineteenth-century England.  Strict liability creates an 
incentive for actors engaging in ultrahazardous activities to 
“cut back on the scale of the activity . . . to slow its spread 
while more is learned about conducting it safely.”  
Classifying database collection as an ultrahazardous 
activity is a logical extension of Posner's analysis.  Just as 
no clear safety standard governing the building and 
maintenance of water reservoirs had emerged in the 1850s, 
a stable set of information-security practices has not yet 
materialized today.  Individuals can do nothing to ensure 
their information remains safely inside an entity's database, 
especially those who have no idea that their data resides 
there.  Database operators, too, are limited in what they can 
do to protect cyber-reservoirs from significant leaks given 
the “inevitability” of data-security breaches, even with 
seemingly responsible levels of precaution against such 
breaches.231  
 
Citron’s analogy to water reservoirs is legitimate and her argument for 
strict liability is persuasive.  Both water reservoirs and databases hold 
enormous resources, making it possible for people to control and process 
these resources for the benefits of society.  When they run well, 
considerable social utilities flow.  However, they are accompanied by 
significant risks and destructive harm.  The problem is that such damage is 
unavoidable, which reduces both the storage of water and collection of 
data to ultrahazardous activities.  Strict liability is a reasonable and 
appropriate response to such activities.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Id. at 265-66 (alterations in the original) (internal citations omitted). 
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[65] In addition, the Restatement of Torts supports the definition of data 
collection as an ultrahazardous activity—the factors to consider in 
deciding whether an activity is abnormally dangerous are as follows: 
 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the 
person, land, or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the 
harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to 
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) 
extent to which the activity is not a matter of common 
usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place 
where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to 
the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.232  
 
[66] An increasing number of data breaches and resulting data loss 
demonstrate a high likelihood of harm, whereas the inevitability of data 
breaches explains the inability to eliminate the risk.  In addition, the threat 
of harm is substantially high enough that it is reasonable for people to feel 
insecure because monetary loss and identity theft are frequent.  Moreover, 
the benefits of data breaches, if any, are negligible in comparison to the 
potential harm.  
  
[67] Furthermore, strict liability is appropriate because it would 
optimize the amount of sensitive personal information that is stored in the 
database.  Many database operators tend to collect every possible piece of 
information irrespective of how it is used because the growth of data 
storage technology has made cost for additional storage practically zero.233  
On the other hand, they do not allocate sufficient resources for 
safeguarding that information because they are rarely held liable under the 
negligence rule and succeed in safely externalizing their business costs.234  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).  
 
233  See Michael Hintze, Protecting Data: Security, Minimization and Anonymization, in 2 
PRACTICING LAW INST., NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAW 299, 
307 (June-July 2008). 
 
234 See Citron, supra note 228, at 265. 
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However, strict liability would change such tendencies.  Database 
operators who keep marginally productive databases or those who are 
vulnerable to a security breach would be forced to decrease data collection 
in addition to bearing the cost of their activities. 
  
[68] Moreover, strict liability is equitable in the sense that a database 
operator is the party who can avoid the loss at the least cost.  Undoubtedly, 
between an individual and a database operator, the database operator is in 
the better position to take responsibility for data breaches because the 
operator has greater economic resources and is equipped with better 
knowledge.235  One problem with this loss allocation rule, however, is that 
it may disincentivize individuals to take steps to reduce the likelihood of 
the loss because individuals have no reason to be cautious, knowing that 
the operator will take full responsibility.  Modern loss allocation schemes 
have addressed this problem by splitting the loss between parties.  For 
example, when a credit card is stolen, a cardholder’s liability is limited to 
fifty dollars for unauthorized use236 and the card issuer absorbs the 
remainder of the loss.237  Imposing some liability on the cardholder makes 
the cardholder protect the card against loss or theft, and imposing some 
liability on the card issuer encourages the card issuer to develop systems 
that prevent the use of stolen cards.238  The goal is to impose enough of a 
loss on individuals to give them an incentive to prevent the fraud without 
overwhelming them. 239   Because it is not only advised, but also 
encouraged, for individuals to take steps to secure personal information, 
this modified approach could serve to promote individuals’ security 
awareness and become an alternative to pure strict liability. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 See id. at 284-85. 
 
236 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (2006).  
 
237 See id. § 1643.  
 
238 See Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft through Loss 
Allocation Rules, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 343, 380 (2003). 
 
239 Id. at 379. 
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IV.  HOW TO STRUCTURE A UNIFORM COMPENSATION SCHEME 
 
[69] There is no law addressing data breaches nor has a uniform 
compensation scheme been established.  Since the numerous state and 
federal laws preventing unauthorized disclosures of personally identifiable 
information were not designed to solve issues arising out of mass data 
losses due to data breaches, they are simply unfit and ill-equipped to deter 
future breaches and achieve effective compensations.  Therefore, this 
article urges Congress to pass a law that would govern data breaches and 
require the FTC to create a comprehensive compensation scheme to 
adequately reflect the respective value of information.  
  
[70] The value of information can be measured.  According to the 
Value of Information formula introduced in Part III, financially sensitive 
information is the most valuable information because its disclosure is 
likely to directly affect an individual’s financial resources and proves 
detrimental to an individual’s financial well-being.  Medical information 
comes second.  The extent of harm due to the disclosure of medical 
information is no less than that of financially sensitive information 
because certain harm, such as a loss of employment and the attachment of 
socially stigmatized diseases, is irreparable.  Nonetheless, the disclosure of 
medical information does not necessarily lead to monetary loss and the 
lower likelihood of such a disclosure makes medical information place 
second.  The least valued information is socially accepted disclosable 
information.  Typical harm due to the disclosure of socially accepted 
disclosable information includes unsolicited marketing and emotional 
distress.  Although constant unsolicited marketing and the resulting 
emotional distress increase the expected value of harm, the benefits of 
disclosure negate the harm.  
  
[71] Despite the disparate value associated with each type of 
information, laws are blind to such differences.  This is because most laws 
were enacted without having weighed the relative value of information 
and ignore the importance of the differing value of each piece of 
information.  For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 
which regulates the accuracy of credit reporting, imposes a minimum $100 
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and a maximum $1,000 fine for willful violations. 240   The Health 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) 
Act addresses the privacy and security concerns associated with the 
electronic transmission of health information and was designed to 
effectively enforce HIPAA rules. 241   The tiers in the HITECH Act 
categorize violations based on mental state from the least to most serious 
and the civil penalty, ranging from $100 to $50,000, reflects the degree of 
the violation.242  Even though information on credit reports is financially 
sensitive information, which is more valuable than medical information, 
the FCRA limits the penalty to $1,000 whereas the HITECH Act allows 
the maximum penalty of $50,000 for each violation. 243   Thus, an 
individual who is denied a line of credit due to wrong information on his 
credit report and as a result loses his business, would receive only $1,000 
whereas another individual whose medical information is intentionally 
uncovered, yet suffers no harm, would be compensated with $50,000.  
  
[72] Much like all personal information, a Social Security number is 
undervalued.  While federal laws do not impose civil penalties for the 
unlawful disclosure of a Social Security number, several states do.244  For 
instance, Arizona prohibits the display of documents that show more than 
five digits of an individual’s Social Security number on public websites 
and an entity that violates the provision is subject to a civil penalty of up 
to $500.245  The state of Michigan enacted the Social Security Number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(b), (n) (2006). 
  
241 See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226, 230, 242 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 
242 See id. at 226-73. 
 
243 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681(n) (limiting the FCRA penalty to $1,000), with 123 Stat. at 
273 (stating the maximum HITECH penalty is $50,000). 
  
244 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1373 (2007). 
 
245 See id.  
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Privacy Act and prohibits the use of more than four sequential digits of the 
Social Security number in addition to restricting the use of Social Security 
numbers on identification and membership cards, permits, and licenses.246  
Moreover, a person who obtains Social Security numbers in the ordinary 
course of business is required to create a privacy policy.247  A violation of 
the Act is punishable by imprisonment for no more than ninety-three days, 
a fine of no more than $1,000, or both.248  New York249 and Texas250 also 
impose up to $1,000 penalties for similar violations.  According to various 
state statutes, an individual’s Social Security number is valued up to $500 
or $1,000 and it is substantially lower than the values of medical 
information under HITECH, which allows compensation up to $50,000.251  
  
[73] The CAN-SPAM Act, which regulates commercial spam mails, 
exemplifies the civil penalty with respect to socially accepted disclosable 
information.252  The Act stipulates civil penalties of $100 for transmitting 
false and misleading information and $25 for other less serious violations, 
such as continuously sending spam e-mails after objection. 253   In 
accordance with the CAN-SPAM Act, sending a deceptive email is 
punishable with the same dollar amount as is imposed by the FCRA for 
furnishing wrong information to a credit reporting agency.254  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.83 (2009). 
 
247 See id. § 445.84. 
 
248 See id. § 445.86. 
 
249 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW, § 399-ddd (McKinney 2009). 
 
250 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.352 (West 2003). 
 
251 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2006). 
 
252 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7706 (2006).  
 
253 Id. § 7706(g)(3).  
 
254 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006). 
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[74] The inadequacy of compensation in part derives from the fact that 
laws governing personal information are outdated.  The FCRA was 
originally passed in 1970.255  Although the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act amended the FCRA in 2003, the amendment did not 
revise the civil penalties and consequently, the dollar amount of penalties 
is still tied to monetary values from the 1970s.256  On the other hand, 
HITECH was signed into law on February 17, 2009,257 which explains the 
higher amount of civil penalties. 
  
[75] To deter future breaches and achieve effective compensations, this 
article argues that it is necessary to establish a uniform civil penalty 
scheme based on the value of information.  However, assigning the exact 
value of each type of information is beyond the scope of this article and 
Congress should pass a law directing the FTC to propose a comprehensive 
compensation system.258  In fact, both the White House and the FTC have 
called for privacy legislation.  On February 23, 2012, the White House 
unveiled its blueprint for a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights to protect 
consumers online.259  Stressing transparency, security, and user control of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 Id. 
 
256 Compare Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, 1953, with 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006). 
 
257 See HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/enforcementrule/hitechenforcement
ifr.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
 
258 See Legal Resources- Statutes Relating to Consumer Protection Mission, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/stat3.shtm (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (“Telemarketing 
and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
6101-6108) . . . requires the FTC to promulgate regulations (1) defining and prohibiting 
deceptive telemarketing acts or practices; (2) prohibiting telemarketers from engaging in 
a pattern of unsolicited telephone calls that a reasonable consumer would consider 
coercive or an invasion of privacy. . . .”).  
 
259 See Danny Weitzner, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration Calls for a Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights for the Digital Age, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2012, 4:00 
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data, it called on Congress to pass legislation based on the Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights model.260 
 
[76] Subsequently on March 26, 2012, the FTC released its final report 
entitled “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: 
Recommendations for Business and Policymakers.”261  The FTC report 
called for the enactment of baseline privacy legislation and for legislation 
giving consumers the right to access personal information held by data 
brokers.262  However, the effect of the Privacy Bill of Rights and the 
FTC’s final report is questionable since both depend on industry self-
regulations.  The Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) 
criticized the FTC for “mistakenly endors[ing] self-regulation” and for not 
using Section 5 power to safeguard consumers’ interests.263  
  
[77] Self-regulation would not go a long way to protect personal 
information.  Constructing and enforcing a uniform civil penalty scheme is 
imperative.  Thus, this article suggests a scheme that models the HITECH 
Act.  The Act, in determining the amount of penalties, takes into account 
the violator’s mental state, from not knowing and exercising reasonable 
diligence to willfully neglectful, and whether the violation has been 
corrected, and sets forth four tiers of penalties.264  If a violator did not 
know, and by exercising reasonable diligence would not have known, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-
calls-consumer-privacy-bill-rights-digital-age. 
 
260 See id. 
 
261 See FTC Issues Final Commission Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/03/privacyframework.shtm. 
 
262 See PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 2, at 72-73. 
 
263 Federal Trade Commission Calls for Privacy Legislation, EPIC (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://epic.org/2012/03/federal-trade-commission-calls.html. 
 
264 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.404(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (2011). 
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he or she violated the law, each violation costs from $100 to $50,000, not 
exceeding $1,500,000 per year.265  When a violation was due to reasonable 
cause and not willful neglect, a penalty ranges from $1,000 to $50,000, not 
exceeding $1,500,000 per year.266  If a violation originated from willful 
neglect but was corrected, a violator is fined from $10,000 to $50,000 for 
each violation, not exceeding $1,500,000 per year.267  For violations 
constituting willful neglect, that are uncorrected and an uncorrected, the 
minimal penalty is $50,000 and is limited to $1,500,000 per year.268  
Likewise, this article proposes that a penalty should be tied to the value of 
information, calculated by the Value of Information equation.  Thus for 
data breaches, an entity who is obligated to secure an individual’s 
information from an unauthorized disclosure pays the individual in the 
amount set below: 
  
Tier A: Socially Accepted Disclosable Information 
(1) If the disclosures involve indirect socially accepted 
disclosable information, $W for each disclosure.  
(2) If the disclosures involve direct socially accepted 
disclosable information, $X for each disclosure. 
  
Tier B: Medical Information   
(1) If the disclosures involve medical information, $Y 
for each disclosure. 
 
Tier C: Financially Sensitive Information 
(1) If the disclosures involve financially sensitive 
information, $Z for each disclosure. 
 
[78] In designing such a scheme, the FTC’s aim should be deterring 
future breaches rather than punishing operators.  Accordingly, the amount 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 See id. § 160.404(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B).  
 
266 See id. § 160.404(b)(2)(ii)(A)-(B). 
 
267 See id. § 160.404(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(B). 
 
268 See id. § 160.404(b)(2)(iv)(A)-(B). 
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of civil penalties should not be excessive, hinder business activities, or 
force database operators out of business.  However, effective deterrence 
demands multiple compensations.  To put it another way, a database 
operator should be required to pay for a loss even if information has been 
previously leaked.  This is because denying compensation due to a 
previous breach and rendering disclosed information unworthy would 
erode the effectiveness of deterrence.  In addition, the amount of a penalty 
should be tied to the number of lost pieces of information so that an 
individual who suffers multiple losses should be entitled to multiple 
compensations.  For example, an individual whose name, phone number, 
and address are disclosed is compensated for the three losses, whereas an 
individual who loses a single e-mail is entitled to a single damage award.  
It would lead the database operator to less likely collect marginally 
productive information. 
   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
[79] Data breaches have become a serious social cost.  An increasing 
volume of personal data is stored and processed, yet no one is held liable 
for unauthorized disclosures and victims are forced to bear the loss.  
Multiple causes contribute to such an inequitable result.  First, courts have 
uniformly held that costs for credit monitoring and emotional distress due 
to an increased risk of identity theft and unsolicited marketing are not 
actual compensable damages.269  Consequently, victims are forced to wait 
until they suffer legally cognizable harm, such as monetary losses, identity 
theft, or even a loss of employment opportunity.  Even if harm occurs, 
multiple causations and alternative explanations for the harm hinder 
victims of data breaches from being adequately compensated.  This article 
finds a solution to such a problem in medical malpractice and toxic tort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 See generally Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation—A Tough 
Road for Plaintiffs, BOSTON B. J., Fall 2011, at 28-29 (stating that claims involving no 
demonstrable use of compromised information have faired poorly). 
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cases where courts have recognized immaterialized future harm and 
emotional distress due to a threat for future injury.270  
  
[80] Compensation becomes more challenging because the database 
operator is not liable for such harm under the traditional tort rule.271  
However, strict liability resolves the issue.  Imposing strict liability is 
appropriate because data collection, which accompanies an unavoidable 
risk of a breach, constitutes an ultrahazardous activity.  It is also 
encouraged because database operators would be compelled to optimize 
the degree of data collection.  An alternative to pure strict liability 
includes requiring victims to bear losses up to a certain point in order to 
promote the awareness in protecting personally identifiable information. 
  
[81] Establishing a uniform compensation scheme is critical.  The 
penalty scheme should be designed to deter future breaches and facilitate 
effective compensation.  Thus, the amount of penalty should not be too 
burdensome to database operators.  This should be made possible by 
Congress, who should order the FTC to conduct research on the values of 
information and tie a civil penalty to each type of information.  
Determining the exact value of information is beyond the scope of this 
article.  Instead, this article formulates the Value of Information equation 
and categorizes information as financially sensitive information, medical 
information, and socially accepted disclosable information, in descending 
order. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 576 A.2d 474, 484 (Conn. 1990) (finding 
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